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ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY 
Rostow, Kennedy, and the Rhetoric of Foreign 
Aid. By Kimber Charles Pearce. East Lan-
sing: Michigan State University Press, 
2001; pp. x + 173. $35.95. 
In Rostow, Kennedy, and the Rhetoric of For-
eign Aid, Kimber Charles Pearce has pro-
vided an interesting and detailed account 
that meets the reader at a number of impor-
tant intersections implicating a bevy of com-
pelling relationships, including but not lim-
ited to social science and public policy, 
rhetoric and history, rhetoric and econom-
ics, influential rhetoric on the presidency 
and a number of presidential administra-
tions, and cold war decision-making and for-
eign policy. Moreover, Pearce employs a 
case study that documents an important pro-
gram: John F. Kennedy's Alliance for 
Progress. As a result, much is accomplished, 
rouch of it original, and all in a rather eco-




Chapter I: "From the Academy to the 
White House: Rostow, Foreign Aid, and So-
cial Scientific Advocacy," provides us with a 
brief biography of Rostow and a record of 
his government service. Rostow would dis-
tinguish himself as a Rhodes scholar at Ox-
ford University, complete a Ph .D. in eco-
nomic history at Yale, and serve during 
World War II at the State Department and at 
the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Ros-
tow returned from the war intent on further 
establishing his academic and public policy 
career. He joined his friend and former CIA 
employee Max F. Millikan to co-found the 
Center for International Studies (CENIS) at 
MIT. The center's mission focused on devel-
oping a "world economic plan in U.S. for-
eign poliCY" (p. 13). While CENIS was as-
sisted by some major foundations, it also 
received funding from the CIA. In Pearce's 
account, it is a somewhat minor disappoint-
ment that the relationship between the CIA 
and CENIS is largely unexplored. What be-
comes clear is that Rostow and his associates 
became convinced that the "gap" between 
the rich and the poor was a destabilizing 
force in world politics and that attention to 
this matter was critical. Rostow was intent 
upon convincing President Eisenhower of 
his views. Between 1956 and 1959, Rostow 
testified three times before Congress, outlin-
ing his views on the Soviets, economic de-
velopment, and U.S. foreign policy issues. 
During the same period Rostow met with 
John F. Kennedy, who served on the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee. Rostow was 
particularly instrumental in advising Kennedy 
on economic aid to India, even drafting 
some of the senator's speeches. Such influ-
ence would carry over into later years. Dur-
ing the 1960 campaign, for example, 
Kennedy employed principles drawn from 
The Stages of Economic Growth to distin-
guish himself from his opponents on the 
question of foreign aid. Rostow worked 
closely with Kennedy during the campaign 
and throughout Kennedy's preSidency 
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where he worked on instituting the Alliance 
for Progress, sat in on discussions on the Bay 
of ~igs fiasco, and served on the president's 
Policy Planning Council at the Department 
of State. Later, Rostow was appointed by 
Lyndon Johnson to the Inter-American 
Committee for the Alliance for Progress 
(CLAP) and later as National Security Ad-
viser. 
Given this brief introduction Pearce turns 
to Chapter 2: "Theory, Countertheory, and 
Rostow's Pursuit of Academic Novelty: The 
Process of Economic Growth." Herein, 
Pearce interrogates Rostovian intellectual 
foundations. The post-World War II envi-
ronment was fertile ground for the renais-
sance of the study of economic develop-
ment. It also provided a platform for 
Rostow's challenge to the neoclassicists. Ros-
tow's analysis of the new economic situation 
was perfectly compatible with the newly re-
formulated cold war environment. Pearce 
explains how and why this was the case. 
Rostow's historical vision of macroeconom-
ics was soon enveloping its creator in a 
"seamless web" of policy formation (p. 33). 
Pearce outlines key proof texts of the Ros-
tovian argument such as those contained in 
The Process of Economic Growth. Professor 
Pearce judiCiously and deftly brings out Ros-
tow's anti-Marxism, his notions of human 
motivation, and his analytic dependence on 
the British industrial revolution as irrefutable 
evidence demonstrating the power of his 
macro analysiS and "six societal propensities 
for capitalistic growth." These Rostovian 
prescriptions fit right in with ethnocentric 
Western Cold War ideology by predicting 
the inevitable triumph of liberal democracy 
and providing yet another vehicle to convey 
a virulent anticommunism. This was wel-
comed in its time by presidents and publics 
alike. 
In Chapter 3: "Ideas in Action: A Pro-
posal: Key to Effective Foreign Policy," 
Pearce turns to Rostow's attempts at influ-
ence during the Eisenhower era. Rostow's 
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concept of modernization and development 
aid looked beyond political alliances and 
military pacts such as the NATO alliance. 
For Rostow, events such as the Suez crisis in 
Egypt in 1956 underscored the need for 
change in Eisenhower's policies regarding 
global communism. Pearce describes the 
Princeton Inn Conference of 1954 to delin-
eate how rhetorical invention occurs in for-
eign aid policy discussions. He then turns to 
a pivotal book developed out of that confer-
ence by Rostow and Millikan, published as A 
Proposal: Key to Effictive Foreign Policy, which 
highlighted a new foreign policy thesis that 
focused on the "non-aligned" nations in Af-
rica, Asia, Central America, and the Middle 
East. The key to a new, effective foreign 
policy, the authors argued, was economic 
rather than military. Development aid would 
assist the United States to fulfill its mis-
sion- "a mission to see the prinCiples of na-
tional independence and human liberty ex-
tended on the world scene" (p. 64). Rostow 
felt that his theory, when applied to public 
policy, could achieve a "peaceful revolution" 
through a balanced "diffusion" of power. 
Rostow seems to have had a modicum of 
success with the Eisenhower administration. 
Pearce points to a "small" Development 
Loan Fund (DLF) created in 1958 as well as 
The International Development Associated 
(IDA) and the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB), both of which were created in 
1959. 
Chapter 4: "Narrative Reason in Rostow's 
Stages of Economic Growth: A Non Com-
munist Manifesto" discusses the evolution of 
and discursive strategies contained, in Ros-
tow's "magnum opus" The Stages of Economic 
Growth. The book combined history with 
macroeconomics to describe five stages of 
development that all nations eventually pass 
through. These stages include: "the tradi-
tional SOCiety, the preconditions for take-off, 
the take-uff, the drive to maturity, and the 
age of high mass consumption" (p. 78). 
Pearce's helpful analYSis refers to the stages 
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as a kind of "frame narrative" and he uncov-
ers other "embedded narratives" in Rostow's 
arguments for modernization. These narra-
tives implicate human motivation, describe 
cold war social organization, and employ the 
"Buddenbrooks analogy," a reference to 
Thomas Mann's novel Buddenhrooks, which 
traces three generations of a merchant class 
family. Using Mann's novel to secure com-
parative advantage in The SUIgtS of Economic 
Growth, Rostow was able to employ the an-
alog to explain transformations in national 
character and reinforce his notion of "diffu-
sion of power." Rostow's Stages had garnered 
him both national and international renown. 
This book would also catapult him into ser-
vice with both the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations. 
Chapter 5: "Advocating the Alliance for 
Progress: Rostow, Kennedy," and the Rhet-
oric of Peaceful Revolution and Chapter 6: 
"From Punta Del Este and Back: The Alli-
ance Fades" are complementary and to-
gether constitute the book's primary rhetor-
ical case study. By the time John F. Kennedy 
took office in 196 1, the "Rostow Doctrine" 
had fully emerged. It was determined that 
Kennedy'S Alliance for Progress would be a 
test site for application of Rostow's "modern-
ization" principles to Latin America. "Eco-
nomic diplomacy" was argued as the best 
road to capturing the minds and hearts of the 
masses of people in the area. Despite con-
comitaot high-minded public discourse, 
"Latin America had become a primary cold 
war battleground" (p. 88) and the new Alli-
ance was formed in part to counter Khrush-
chev's reported intention to conduct global 
wars of national liberation. Threats to the 
Western hemisphere were seen as best han-
dled through "counterinsurgency" and 
"peaceful revolution" spurred by economic 
development. Rostow's influence in realizing 
these policies is well-documented. Rostow's 
hand can also be seen in Kennedy'S rhetor-
ical campaign on behalf of the Alliance for 
Progress. Pearce does a nice job of detailing 
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that campaign and relies prinCipally on a 
rhetorical analysis of arguments advanced in 
four specific Kennedy addresses: theJanuary 
20 Inaugural Address, the January 30 An-
nual Message to Congress, the March 13 
Address at a Reception for Members of Con-
gress and the Latin Diplomatic Corp (where 
JFK introduced his plans for the Alliance) 
and a Special Message to Congress on For-
eign Aid, March 22, 1961. Interestingly, 
Pearce maintains that the sum total of this 
rhetorical foray yielded "mixed messages" 
that to "a great degree"(p. 99) reflected "in-
consistencies in Rostow's economic theory" 
(p. 100). In addition, after the Bay of Pigs 
fiasco the inconsistencies between "counter-
insurgency" and "peaceful revolution" were 
laid bare and, as a resul~ Kennedy's Alliance 
was largely "discredited." The fallout also 
plagued the August 1961 Punta Del Este 
meeting with OAS members. But the found-
ing charter of the Alliance and some unreal-
istic operational stipulations also proved 
vexing for Latin Americans. 
After military coups in the Dominican Re-
public and Honduras, the handwriting was 
on the wall, the Alliance was fading. After 
Kennedy's assassination, it fell to the John-
son administration to revive it. Thomas 
Mann received a new appointment as Assis-
tant Secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs and this was interpreted by some "as 
the definitive end of the Alliance program" 
(p. 109). By 1966, Rostow had assumed the 
position of national security adviser. In the 
LBJ years Rostow had shifted his position to 
promote private sector investment as the 
best route to modernization in Latin Amer-
ica. Nevertheless, the Alliance had become 
an important symbol and LBJ, partially in an 
attempt to divert attention from his growing 
dilemma in Vietnam, helped publicize the 
second Punta Del Este meeting in April of 
1967. Six months later Rostow feebly re-
ported that the results were "not dramatic" 
and blamed lackluster Congressional appro-
priations (p. 114). Pearce concludes that 
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while "Roslow's stages of growth model was 
a persuasive instrument of social scientific 
and political advocacy, its totalizing assess-
ment of the economic evolution of develop-
ing countries could not be converted into an 
operational form generalizable from nation 
to nation" (p. 115). 
Pearce has crafted an excellent book; it is 
well-researched and well-documented and 
demonstrates judicious use of archival mate-
rials. Pearce provides an interesting history 
and an insightful rhetorical analysis. In short, 
this is a fine example of rhetorical history. 
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